The Economics of Gender

Presentasi berjudul: "The Economics of Gender"— Transcript presentasi:

1 The Economics of Gender

2 Gender vs Sex Sex: perbedaan secara biologis
Laki-laki vs perempuan Gender: Characteristics as attributed that are socially associated with being female and male Feminine Masculine

3 What is economics of gender ?
Interaksi agen ekonomi dalam keluarga, perusahaan dan pasar, sebagai laki-laki dan perempuan berbeda. Hal ini dipelajari dalam economics of gender

4 Seringkali Keliru Contoh:
– Angka Partisipasi Angkatan Kerja Menurut Gender seharusnya menurut sex (jenis kelamin) – Upah Pekerja Industri Manufaktur Menurut Gender ? Padahal kita hanya menyajikan statistik laki‐laki dan perempuan.

5 Kajian Gender yang Benar
Kajian mengapa Angka Partisipasi Angkatan Kerja Perempuan selalu lebih rendah dari laki‐laki? Jawab: karena budaya patriarki bahwa laki‐laki bekerja di luar rumah, perempuan di dapur dan mengurus anak

6 What is Gender Economics ?
Menerangkan bagaimana perbedaan gender (gender differences) sbg pelaku ekonomi menghasilkan perbedaan keluaran ekonomi (economic outcomes) terhadap masing‐masing jenis kelamin Ukurannya ?

7 Ukuran yang Digunakan Ukurannya: – Pendapatan, penghasilan, tingkat kemiskinan, jumlah jam kerja dsb. – Dan ukuran lain yang dipakai para ekonom untuk menentukan kesejahteraan ekonomi laki‐laki dan perempuan (alokasi waktu lk vs pr).

8 Is Economcs Gender Blind ?
Is macroeconomic policy gender blind? They persue aggregate goals, blind to differential impacts on all individuals Gender Sector Location

9 Isu Gender dalam Economi
1. Pelaku ekonomi di masyarakat dapat laki‐laki atau perempuan 2. Mereka berinteraksi dalam keluarga, perusahaan maupun pasar. 3. Dua hal ini harus dipelajari dalam ekonomi gender untuk dapat dikatakan valid

10 Gender Blind The omission of gender concerns: So what ?
Generates policy with inefficienct macro level outcomes Give unpredicted micro level consequences for women, children and families. So what ?

11 Isu Gender Kesetaraan Gender yaitu kesetaraan dalam akses, partisispasi, kontrol dan manfaat. Sehingga: terjadi kesetaraan hak di dalam segala sendi kehidupan

12 Di masyarakat kita selalu bertanya mengapa laki‐laki dan perempuan selalu berbeda dalam kegiatan ekonomi? Pdhl lk maupun pr adalah pelaku ekonomi Mengapa pendapatan perempuan selalu lebih rendah dari laki‐laki?

13 Mengapa banyak terjadi sex segregation dalam pekerjaan,dan apa akibatnya terhadap perbedaan pendapatan? Apakah peningkatan jumlah perempuan dalam pasar kerja menyebabkan peningkatan tabungan rumah tangga, meningkatkan household autonomy, atau perceraian atau jumlah anak sedikit?

14 Perspektif Ekonomi Gender
Pendekatan ekonomi yang menerangkan perbedaan‐perbedaan gender. Prinsip ekonomi: Pengambilan keputusan dalam kelangkaan sumber daya (Decision making under constraints ‐scarcity) Bhw manusia itu selalu bertindak rasional, yi: Konsisten: bertindak sama dlm situasi yg sama Visioner: mempertimbangkan efek ke depan,jangka panjang dan dampak tak langsung dari tingkah laku mrk.

15 Tetap Gunakan Prinsip Ekonomi
Scarcity, sumber daya terbatas vs keinginan tidak terbatas Opportunity cost, biaya kesempatan yang hilang Marginal benefit vs marginal cost Marginal utility Market : konsep penawaran (supply) dan permintaan(demand) dalam pasar (termasuk pasar kerja)

16 Gender Bias in the Economic Theory
Sen (1990), suggested perception of roles and relative value may influence allocation resources within the household. Discrimination suggested that perception of both women and employers affect wage determination in the market (Bruce, 1989) Blinkers occure! What is these blinkers?

17 Blinkers and Problems in Economic Theory
Boundary Blinkers Invalid assumption about the nature and importance of boundary between the household and market is boundary blinkers (gender blind) Boundary blinkers, failure to correctly specified the “base populartion” for the measurement of economic activity.

18 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
Consequences: Movements of productive activities from household to market are intepreted as an increase in production because the basis for comparison is not the total universe of economic activity (only monitise) Taking account this problem: New household economics (NHE): time allocation

19 Blinkers and Problems in Economic Theory
Clearly seen in: National accounting system Measurement of economic growth Transfer from household production is invisible Result of boundary blinkers: Disinvestments in human resources, as efficient: transfer burden from public sector (out of monetise economy) Burden falls to household where real but nonmonetise cst becomes convieniently invisible This: false impression of net efficiency gain for both public sector and economy as a whole

20 Blinkers and Problems in Economic Theory
2. Measurement Blinkers Is to take account accurate recognition of women’s contribution to economic preoduction due to under enumeration of their participation in the labor force. Simple Microec theory asume work or not decision is only about allocation of time between work or leisure

21 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
Men and women have different activities, women also bear primarily responsibility for biological and social reproduction. Men: devide time between mutually exclusive activities Women: engage multiple an concurrent activities (biological reproduction and child care: continual and large demand demands of time)

22 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
GDP, doent measure women and men’s contribution, the lower the FFP for women, the lower the contribution and no particular importance. Women’s contribution are overlooked and underenumerated (contribution to wealth and welfare of their family and community)

23 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
3. The Specification Problem Problem arise from the failure of conventional economics to identify and take to account the opportunity cost of women’s time. Opprtunity cost of working includes: child care, domestic work, community activities. Nonmarket activities: treated as costless and ignored, it is unpriced resource.

24 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
The key is to use opportunity cost of nonmonetise activities. Women’s domestic activities, create human capital (health and education and quality of future generation) therefore contribute to economic production

25 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
4. The efficiency Problem Focus in microec: allocative efficiency, defined by pareto criterion. Pareto optimum: situation which not posibble to change allocation of resources without making someone worse off. At macro level: short term static allocative efficeincy is achieved when it is imposible to rearrange resources to increase total output

26 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
Dynamic allocative efficiency: Long term resource allocation Effect gender bias: Acts as subsidy, unpaid household inputs are unpaid the true value Women’s unpaid family labor subsidised economic preoduction generally Unequal acsess on control of resources. Inability to move between jobs, and to search higher returns, lack the incentives for HH to provide complementary physical capital or technology to raise women’s labor productivity

27 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
Value of women’s reproductive role undervalued Lower lifetime earnings, lead to no incentive to undertake human capital investment among women 5. Contextual Blinkers Is blinked to the economic significance of social and institutional context in which economic activity takes place. Neglect the role: families, households, social and cultural norms, conventions and institutions. (important for women)

28 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
Family and household considered as moral economy: individual decision to max utility NHE, individuals operate using shadow price Values, attitudes, social conventions, behavioral norms and cultural mores are overlooked Neoclassical economic theory assume: agents behave in fundamentally similar ways. Do they? They differ by norm, cultural and society values

29 Blinkers and Problems in the Economic Theory
This blinker: made owmen to be ignored by social and institutions. Contextual blinkers: blind fact that social conventions are another source of allocative inefficiency, restricting free movement of female resources to their most productive use. By increasing social and psychological cost and reducing the benefit of market work for women.

30 Gender Differentiated Impact of Macroeconomic Policy
Affect household through income, prices of goods consumed, access to public goods amd household participation in production and work. SR: effects depend on role in household LR: effects human capital formation, will change incentives or capacity to undertake longrun investments

31 Konsep dasar perbedaan laki‐laki dan perempuan dlm ekonomi
Memakai ukuran‐ukuran tentang pendapatan, penghasilan, partisipasi angkatankerja, tingkat kemiskinan, pembagian waktu rumah vs pasar kerja dll Kajian tentang tren perubahan antar waktu memberikan ilustrasi pemberdayaan peremp. Dan mencari latar belakang terjadinya mengapa terjadi perubahan: mis. perubahan setting organisasi kemasyarakatan yg menyebabkan terjadinya perbedaan gender dlm semua aspek ekonomi

32 Berapa Banyak Laki-laki dan Perempuan Bekerja
Diukur dengan Angka Partisipasi Angkatan Kerja (Labor Force Participation Rate). Bekerja = melakukan kegiatan untuk upah, gaji atau keuntungan (uang atau non‐uang) Menganggur= tidak bekerja tetapi sedang mencari pekerjaan

33 Trend TPAK Data tren TPAK memperlihatkan perubahan setting dan pemberdayaan perempuan. TPAK perempuan meningkat tajam, tetapi tetap lebih rendah dibanding TPAK laki‐laki TPAK laki‐laki relatif stabil, tetapi tetap tinggi Mengapa TPAK perempuan meningkat tajam? (kini lebih banyak perempuan masuk pasar kerja, ini pemberdayaan perempuan atau kemiskinan?

34 Pertanyaan perbedaan gender (data USA, 1950‐1990)
Mengapa TPAK perempuan selalu lebih rendah dari pada laki‐laki? Mengapa peningkatan TPAK Perempuan sangat tajam? Tetapi lebih rendah dari TPAK laki‐laki? TPAK laki‐laki stabil tetap tinggi Mengapa tingkat pengangguran perempuan selalu lebih tinggi dari laki‐laki?

35 Mengapa terjadi peningkatan TPAK perempuan kawin?
Terutama TPAK perempuan kawin yang mempunyai anak balita meningkat tajam? Perempuan lebih banyak bekerja sebagai clerical work dan sektor jasa Laki‐laki lebih banyak bekerja di menjadi manager dan professional Laki‐laki bekerja di pertambangan, konstruksi, transport dan utilities (listrik, telpon dll).

36 Keikutsertaan dalam Serikat Kerja
Keikut sertaan perempuan pekerja dlm serikat pekerja lebih rendah dr laki‐laki dan stabil, tidak berubah Kasus perempuan yg ditangani serikat pekerja juga rendah (peremp 15% laki 20%) Tetapi ada tendensi keanggotaan perempuan dlm SP meningkat dari 18% thn 1950 ke 38%tahun 1990 (jumlh perempuan/jumlh SP). Apakah kita punya data tentang ini?

37 Gender Gap Penghasilan
Diukur dari rasio penghasilan pr thd lk Ada tendensi rasio meningkat, artinya ada peningkatan penghasilan perempuan Peningkatan kualitas kerja pr vs lk? Penurunan diskriminsasi thd perempuan di pasar kerja Shift struktur pekerjaan ke arah modern sector –manufacture, finance, foreign trade Convergence of occupational distribution of men and women? (pekerjaan bisa dilakukan leh pr maupun lk.)

38 Bagaimana Kesejahteraan Perempuan
Penghasilan Pr selalu lebihrendah dari LK Akses PR terhadap sumber daya keuangan lebih rendah dr LK, tdk punya kontrol, tdk menikmati manfaat, tdk mendapat hak, ketimpangan gender, tdk ada kesetaraan Lk dgn pendapatan tinggi cenderung menikah dgn Pr pendapatan lebih rendah. Msh berlaku? Dilihat dlm keluarga: gabungan pendapatan. Less variation of income at family level

39 Household as an Economic Unit

40 Kompisisi Rumah Tangga (living arrangement)
Difinisi rumah tangga (BPS) Komposisi: jumlah dan siapa anggota RT Keluarga batih (Ortu + anak) Keuarga luas (Ortu+anak+orang lain) Lain2: three generations under one roof Bagaimana pembagian kerjanya? Siapa yang lebih berkuasa dlm pengambilan keputusan ? Kepala RT, KRT bersama isteri?, Isteri saja?

41 Keuntungan tinggal bersama vs sendiri
1. Economies of production – belanja bersama, masak bersama dll (cost sharing) 2. Internalisasi dr externalisasi 3. Meringankan biaya transaksi 4. Meringankan variasi utilitas karena resource pooling

42 Power distribution in household
Money (yg bawa uang ke rumah lebih powerful) Patriarchy (helping husband maintaining harmony) Children Re‐negotiation of power within a household (kalau suami isteri sama sama bekerja?)

43 Money as source of power
Partner yg membawa penghasilan lebih besar ke rumah, punya power utk ambil keputusan Tentang hal‐hal penting: beli rumah, mobil, perlengkapan rumah, siapa yang tentukan suami? Isteri, pengambil keputusan seputar anak, dapur,mengunjungi keluarga Siapa menentukan isteri untuk ber KB? Dan jumlah anak yg diinginkan?

44 Budaya patriarki dan pembagian kerja
Idealnya pembagian kerja yg rasional adalah seimbang antara lk dan pr Tapi budaya patriarki cenderung mengunggulkan lk sebagai bread‐winner, diskriminasi perempuan di pasar kerja, menurunkan potensi perempuan untuk memperoleh pendapatan,seumur hidup tergantung suami, akses, kontrol dan manfaat terbatas, tidak ada kesetaraan, gender gap.

45 Double burden perempuan bekerja
Meskipun isteri masuk pasar kerja tetapi tetap mengerjakan pekerjaan rumah tangga, mengasuh anak, masak, nyuci dll. Suami? Mana egalitarianisme? Isteri bekerja : market and non market work Isteri melepaskan hak leisure time Leisure time = non market good?, maka isteri mendapat share lebih kecil dlm HH total production

46 Gender and demographic change

47 Gender system: socially constructed expectations for male and female behaviour that are found in the society Division of labor and responsibility (granted different rights and obligation) Side effect: inequality power between sexes, autonomy, and well being—disdavantage of females

48 Demographic change: change over time in a population
Fertility Mortality Migration (not a focus in researches) What specific variabel must be altered to influence fertility and mortality

49 Fertility Bongaarts proximate detrminant:
Age of women becoming sexually active Prevalence, duration and intersity of breastfeeding Contraceptive use Use of abortion

50 Mortality Mosly and Chen: 5 major proximate determianat s of infant and child mortality: Maternal factors (mothers age, number of previous births, interval Environmental contamination Nutrient deficiency Injury Personal illness control

51 Individual have important role in affectting fertility and mortality
Difficulties in studying gender and demographic change: no means unique to this topic, mkin strong causal inerence about gender systems and demographic change, complexity of gender system, varying role that of gender system apear to play under different circumstances

52 What DO We Know Fertility:
female education and employement to fertility is consistant and robust than employement fertility (positive, nol) The relationship is greater among educated women. Female empowerment, reduces fertility and increase contraceptive use

53 What Do We Know Chilhood Mortality
Maternal education: increase childhood survival by women becoming more self confident, communicative relationship with spouse Women’s education:strongly related to chilhood survival: health care, hygiene Women’s employment: increase resources to improve childrens nutrition or health care Partriachal gender system: elevated deaths among female children.

54 The Impact of Demographic Change on Gender Systems
Historically, demographic change has also affected gender system change How? Lower Fertility: women have more fee time-enter LF, have higher education, have own income, more bargaining power The demographic regime: fertility below the replacement level and high life expectancy as precondition to gender change.

55 The Impact of Demographic Change on Gender Systems
Scarcity of women: increase their value in marriage market Timing of motherhood and marriage: strong effects on women’s subsequent achievements and well being. (autonomy and power within family) Achievement of a modern demographic regime may be one pre-condition for changes in women’s and men’s lives that eventually lead to a less stratified gender system

56 How much do men and women work ?

57 How much Do Men and Women Work? 
By age group, marital status, presence of children (USA, ) Men: Participation decrease among youngger and older age Postpone entering labor market: schooling Retire at early ages Women: LFP increase, greater among married women, tripling among women with preschool children Why ? Increase demand this increases their wage, draws them into LF

58 Part time Workers as % of Total Employment by Sex, 1970, 1980 and 1992
Women Men Total 1970 27,5 9,5 16,4 1980 26,8 9,6 16,9 1992 25,4 10,8 17,5

59 Percentage Distribution of Family Income, Median, Mean Family Income by Sex, 1988
Men Women < $ 5000 2,6 3,9 $ 6,5 9,2 $ 16,9 19,2 $ 19,5 18,9 $ 17,3 16,1 $ 13,3 12,3 $ 15,3 13,0 $ 5,4 4,7 ≥ $ 3,2 2,7 Median Income $32.039 $ Mean Income $38.732 $

60 Allocation of Time: % Distribution of Weekly Time Devoted to Various Activities by Sex, 1985
Women Men Personal Care 44 Leisure 23 24 Paid Work 13 Housework 12 5 Shopping 4 3 Childcare 1

61 Explanation of Women’s LFP
Demand side: General rise in labor Rise in education of women Supply factors: Rising wages for women Changing technology of nonmarket production Change in family composition Falling male wages

62 Explanation in the Fall of Men’s LFP
Demand side Sectoral decline in labor demand in sectors where men predominantly employed (manufacturing) Increase in substitution of female for male labor Supply side factors: Rising real wages Rises in nonearned income

63 Women’s formal labor force participation lowest among all regions

64 Characteristics of women in the labor market
Female Education and Labor Force Participation in MENA and EAP, Percent Note: In East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), secondary enrollment is for 1999 rather than 2000 Source: ILO 1996; World Bank 2003d, 2003j Left figure: For all countries in MENA, the observed rates of female participation are lower—often by a substantial margin – than would be expected from the other characteristics of the female working-age population. This observation indicates that the potential to integrate women into the regional economy, determined by the past investment in female education and recent fertility trends, has not been realized. In countries for which comparisons overtime can be made, the ration improved between 1980 and 2000 in all except Tunisia, but they always remain lower than one. This improvement shows that many MENA countries are including their women in the labor force faster than they are improving women’s education al attainment and reducing fertility. As education increases and fertility decreases, the “expected” rate of female labor force participation increases. If the ratio of the observed to the expected rates of female labor forced participation improves overt time, it means that the observed rate is growth faster than the rate that would be expected (on the basis of higher education and lower fertility. This progress is still relatively slow when compared to other regions, but it can be increased. (p. 62) Right figure: This figure uses female secondary enrollments as a proxy for average years of schooling. It shows that the massive investment in female education will not be achieved so long as female participation in the labor force continues to lag. In contrast, in regions where female participation is high, investments in female education are more fully used. In East Asia an Pacific region, for example, most women work, which implies that most girls receiving an education will use that education in their productive potential (as well as the other benefits of education.). (P. 68)

65 Characteristics of women in the labor market
Female Unemployment Rates by Educational Level in MENA Countries, Various Years Left figure: For all countries in MENA, the observed rates of female participation are lower—often by a substantial margin – than would be expected from the other characteristics of the female working-age population. This observation indicates that the potential to integrate women into the regional economy, determined by the past investment in female education and recent fertility trends, has not been realized. In countries for which comparisons overtime can be made, the ration improved between 1980 and 2000 in all except Tunisia, but they always remain lower than one. This improvement shows that many MENA countries are including their women in the labor force faster than they are improving women’s education al attainment and reducing fertility. As education increases and fertility decreases, the “expected” rate of female labor force participation increases. If the ratio of the observed to the expected rates of female labor forced participation improves overt time, it means that the observed rate is growth faster than the rate that would be expected (on the basis of higher education and lower fertility. This progress is still relatively slow when compared to other regions, but it can be increased. (p. 62) Right figure: This figure uses female secondary enrollments as a proxy for average years of schooling. It shows that the massive investment in female education will not be achieved so long as female participation in the labor force continues to lag. In contrast, in regions where female participation is high, investments in female education are more fully used. In East Asia an Pacific region, for example, most women work, which implies that most girls receiving an education will use that education in their productive potential (as well as the other benefits of education.). (P. 68)

66 Female labor force participation and higher overall employment
This figure is trying to debunk the myth that women take away jobs from men. First, higher unemployment rates for women than for men indicate that the employment of women does not displace the employment for men, and that there is not a simple correlation between the supply of female labor and the relate of male or overall unemployment. Empirical evidence shows that the direction of causality, in the relationship between unemployment and the increases in labor supply, is not straightforward. (For more discussion – see page 77 of the report) The figure above shows that those countries that have a higher female labor force participation have also a lower rate of overall unemployment. And some countries with low female labor force participation are also those with relatively high overall unemployment rates. Empirical evidence does not support the claim that women’s increased labor force participation increases unemployment

67 Household as An Economic unit

68 Percentage Distribution of Married Couple Families by Labor Force Status of Spouse, 1991
Husband and Wife in LF 54,0 Husband in LF, Wife not in LF 24,3 Both not in LF 17,0 Wife in LF, Husband not in LF 4,7

69 How Power is Distributed inHousehold
Money as Power Patriarchy on household sharing Women care more in children Renegoriation of sharing rules