Presentasi berjudul: "Bab 4 Metafisika. Metafisika Kajian Asal Usul Andronikus (± 70 sM) dari Pulau Rhodes mengumpulkan karya Aristoteles serta membaginya menjadi dua kelompok."— Transcript presentasi:
Bab 4 Metafisika
Metafisika Kajian Asal Usul Andronikus (± 70 sM) dari Pulau Rhodes mengumpulkan karya Aristoteles serta membaginya menjadi dua kelompok Kelompok phusika (fisika) ilmu alam, fisika teori politik, psikologi dan sejenisnya Kelompok meta ta phusika (sesudah fisika) teleologi, asas pertama hakikat realitas dan sejenisnya Meta ta phusika menjadi metafisika Metafisika dikenal sebagai filsafat pertama
Metafisika Kajian Pokok Bahasan (1) Inkuiri ke apa yang ada (exist), atau apa yang betul-betul ada (2) Ilmu tentang realitas, sebagai lawan dari tampak (appearance) (3) Studi tentang dunia secara menyeluruh (4) Teori tentang asas pertama (first principle); prima causa Ontologi dan Kosmologi Ontologi adalah bagian metafisika tentang hakikat realitas Kosmologi adalah bagian metafisika tentang proses realitas Obyek utama metafisika adalah partikular (materi) dan universal (ide)
ONTOLOGY Ontology is the theory or study of being as such; i.e. of the basic characteristics of all reality. Though the term was first coined in the 17 th century, ontology is synonymous with metaphysics or “first philosophy” as defined by Aristotle in the 4 th century BC. Because metaphysics came to include other studies (e.g. philosophical cosmology and psychology), ontology has become the preferred term for the study of being. It was brought into prominence in the 18 th century by Christian Wolff, a German rationalist, for whom it was a deductive discipline leading to necessary truths about the essences of beings. His great successor Immanuel Kant, however, presented influential refutations of ontology as deductive system and of the ontological argument for God’s necessary existence (as supreme and perfect being). With the 20 th –century renovation of metaphysics, ontology or ontological thought has again become important, notably among phenomenologists and existentialists, among them Martin Heidegger.
Metafisika Kajian Partikular bBenda yang kita lihat satu demi satu (pohon itu, buku ini, langit biru itu) adalah partikular Dikenal juga sebagai obyek satu demi satu, obyek dunia nyata, alam, substansi, materi Sering diidentifikasi sebagai partikular atau materi Ada banyak partikular, termasuk yang kurang sempurna Universal Keseluruhan benda dengan ciri atau bentuk atau form sama (semua pohon, semua buku, semua biru) adalah universal Dikenal juga sebagai obyek di dalam pikiran, bentuk atau form, abstraksi, konsep, ide Sering diidentifikasi sebagai universal atau ide Hanya ada satu universal, dan sempurna
FORM Form, the external shape, appearance, or configuration of an object, in contraindication to the matter of which it is composed; in metaphysics, the active, determining principle of a thing as distinguished from matter, the potential principle. The word “form” has been used in a number of ways throughout the history of philosophy and aesthetics. It was early applied to Plato’s term eidos, by which he identified the permanent reality that makes a thing what it is, in contrast to the particulars that are finite and subject to change. The Platonic concept of form was itself derived from the Pythagorean theory that intelligible structures (which Pythagoras called numbers), and not material elements, gave objects their distinctive characters. Plato developed this theory into the concept of “eternal form,” by which he meant the immutable essence that can only be “received” or “imitated” by material, or sensible, things. Plato held that eternal forms, though they were not tangible, were of a higher reality than material objects. For practical purposes Aristotle was the first to distinguish between matter (hypokeimenon or hyle) and form (eidos or morphe). He rejected the abstract Platonic notion of form and argued that every sensible
object consists of both matter and form, neither of which can exist without the other. To Aristotle matter was the undifferentiated primal element; it is that form which things develop rather than a thing in itself. The development of particular things from this general matter consists in differentiation, the acquiring of the particular forms of which the knowable universe consists. Matter is the potential factor, form the actualizing factor. (Aristotle further posited the existence of a prime, or unmoved, mover, i.e., pure form separated from matter, eternal and immutable). Thus according to Aristotle, the matter of a thing will consist of those elements of it which, when the thing has come into being, may be said to have become it; and the form is the arrangement of organization of those elements, as the result of which they have become the thing they have. Thus, bricks and mortar are the matter that, given one form, became a house, or, given another, became a wall. As matter they are potentially any thing that they can become; it is the form which determines that they actually become. Here “matter” is a relative term, for a brick on the pile, which potentially part of a house, is already actually a brick; i.e., it is itself a composite of form and matter, clay being matter to the brick as the brick is to the house or to the wall. Matter is that which is potentially
a given object but which actually becomes the object only when it is given the right form. Aristotle’s notion of form combines with his teleological viewpoint to give the conclusion that formal development has a direction and may have a goal and that some things are more informed than others. Bricks are more informed than clay, and a house more than bricks. The Aristotelian concept of form was uniquely adapted to Christianity by Thomas Aquinas, whose works mark the high point of the medieval Scholastic tradition. Aquinas further delineated the concept of form to include “accidental form,” a quality of a thing that is not determined by its essence; “sensible form,” that element of form that can be distinguished from matter by sense-perception; and other such distinctions. Other Scholastic philosophers, including John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, worked with the Aristotelian concept of form, but none to as great in effect as Aquinas. For 18 th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, form was a property of mind; he held that form is derived from experience, or, in other words, that it is imposed by the individual on the material object. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant identified space and time
as the two forms of sensibility, reasoning that though man does not experience space and time as such, he cannot experience anything except in space and time. Kant further delimited 12 basic categories that act as structural elements for human understanding. Criticism. The concept of form is also indispensable to the practice and criticism of several disciplines other than philosophy. In literature, for example, the term may refer to the schema, structure, or genre that a writer chooses for the presentation of his subject—e.g., novel, short story, maxim, haiku, sonnet, etc.; it may also refer to the internal structure of the work, and to a great extent, a work’s critical success depends on the degree to which the artist is able to integrate the content and internal structure within the framework of its external form. In criticism of the graphic arts, the term form refers to the effect achieved by draftsmanship or mass as distinct form that achieved by such elements as colour or texture. In sculpture and other plastic arts, form (or shape) is both tangible and visible and this is the chief eternal of organization.
UNIVERSALS Universals, a term in philosophy. For many centuries the theory of universals has been a battleground for philosophers of contending schools and the issue of whether universals exist is still unsettled. From time to time, the universals has been regarded as (1) an object existing in its own right (sometimes as the most permanent of all existences); (2) a concept nascent in the mind and thus subjective; (3) a word or series of words; (4) an identical quality, or group of qualities; (5) a recurring resemblances; (6) that which can be predicted of each and every individual in a species or all species in a genus; (7) a principle of classification. To complicate the issue further the universals has at times been identified with the species, the genus and the class. Origin and Development. Differences in theory are due in part to the different pressures working upon philosophers in adumbrating their doctrine. Socrates (?469 BC-399) and his friends were concerned with the metaphysical problem of the One and the Many and with the problem of the objectivity of human values. The doctrine that uni-
versals were ideas, eternal and unchanging, and that individuals were shadowy manifestations of such ideas was put forward to help solve these problems. Plato (428/427 BC-348/347) sometimes supports and sometimes criticizes this solution, whereas Aristotle (384 BC-322) rejects it. The latter was deeply concerned with logical problems, particularly that of the predicate (what is affirmed to belong to something else). From this standpoint the universals is more readily conceived as the common quality or qualities of a group of material substances, some of these qualities being essential. Reflection on the predicate led other philosophers to regard the universals as an abstraction, not itself existing outside the mind. These differing opinions on the universals are reflected in the famous remarks of Anicius Boethius (c. 480-c. 524), which provided the text for medieval speculation. Do universals, he asked, “exist in reality or solely in thoughts”? If they do exist, “are they then corporeal bodies or incorporeal”? Are they “separated from sensible things”? Or are they “in sensible things”? Later medieval writers, such as Johannes Scotus Erigena (c. 815-c. 877) and Anselm of Laon (d. 1117),
took the view that universals do exist really, but Rocelin de Compiegne (d.c. 1120) and his pupil Peter Abelard ( ) began to question the realist solution. The universal man, says Abelard, is no eternal Idea of Man but the being of man, and the being of man is neither a real man nor any other real thing. Formalization of Theories. A century later Albertus Magnus (1193/ ) formulated the different theories: universals, he held, are viewed 1) as existing before the things which exemplify them, they are ante rem, 2) as existing in the things, in materia or in re, and 3) as abstractions, in thought only, that is post rem. His pupil, Thomas Aquinas (? ), blended the three solutions into his own theory. On the whole the 13 th century accepted a modified realism (belief in the reality of universals, not to be confused with material realism) with some suggestion of a post rem theory, but it was the latter which became more prominent in the next century, particularly in the writings of William of Ockham (c ). Supporters of the post rem theory in the later medieval period became known as “nominalists,” yet it is necessary to distinguish, under the post rem heading,
between nominalists and conceptualists. For conceptualists the universals in a concept, for the nominalists it is a word or set of words only. In spite of the attribution of the term “nominalist” to late medieval philosophers, they were in fact conceptualist; this is certainly true of Ockham. Modern Tenets. In the modern period dispute about universals has never wholly died down; generally, too, the solutions have been within the medieval framework. The ante rem theory has had few open adherents, although something like this theory may be implicit in idealist thought. The other extreme, nominalism, has had more support and has recently been fashionable solution in some quarters. Nominalsim was never stated more plainly than by Thomas Hobbes ( ), “there being nothing in the world universal but names,” yet it is questionable whether Hobbes’s final theory is strictly nominalist, and though the nominalsim of today is strong in the critical side it, too, usually so qualifies its positive statement as to leave one in doubt whether it really is frequently blended with conceptualism. Mathematical Logic and Universals. A word should be added on the treatment of universals by mathematical logicians. Gottlob Frege ( ) in
his On Concept and Object distinguishes between the object and what is predicated of it, the concept. For example, take the concept named “blue.” It is predicable of many objects, and is in this sense a universal; it is something unsaturated in need of supplementation (“—blue”). A concept, for Frege, can be said to be a function which may be symbolized Fx, where x is the object variable and F the symbol of the concept or attribute, and the class of all objects having the property F may symbolized (x)(Fx). There is a tendency to treat functions as classes and hence render mathematical theory extensional. Without discussing here the justification of this move, it is clear that it does not free us from the problem of universals, as has sometimes been suggested. On the contrary, the question arises whether the class is discovered, or invented, or denied all existence (even as an invention “in the mind”). The debate in the mathematical philosophy between logicism (Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russsell, Alonzo Church), intuitionism (Luitzen Egbertus, Jan Brouwer, Herman Weyl, G.F.C. Griss), and formalism (David Hilbert) is a special case of the more general debate between realists, conceptualists, and nominalists respectively.
Metafisika Ontologi Hakikat Realitas Ada dua macam pertanyaan utama: Mana lebih utama, partikular (materi) ataukah universal (ide)? Apakah universal suatu realitas? Idealisme dan Materialisme Paham yang mengutamakan ide (universal) sebagai realitas dikenal sebagai paham idealisme Paham yang mengutamakan materi (partikular) sebagai realitas dikenal sebagai paham materialisme
Metafisika Ontologi Realisme, Konseptualisme, Nominalisme Aliran yang beranggapan bahwa universal adalah suatu realitas dikenal sebagai aliran realisme Aliran yang beranggapan bahwa universal adalah konsep di dalam pikiran dikenal sebagai aliran konseptualisme Aliran yang beranggapan bahwa universal hanyalah nama yang diberikan oleh manusia dikenal sebagai aliran nominalisme Kerumitan Realisme Banyak penganut idealisme menentang realisme Pada zaman pertengahan, realisme menjadi bahan perdebatan selama berabad-abad
METAPHYSICS Metaphysics, branch of philosophy concerned with critically examining basic philosophical assumptions and identifying what exists insofar as it exists. Metaphysics interacts with such other philosophical studies as logic, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics. Metaphysics has by tradition concerned itself with issues with broad philosophical interest. One of the most basic issues, first addressed by ancient Greek philosophers, is the existence and nature of forms, i.e. abstract realities which are objects of the mind. Since the classical Greek philosophers distinguished between objects of the real world—sensible things—and objects of the mind—ideas—metaphysical philosophers have concerned themselves with the relationship between abstractions and substances, trying to determine whether both are real or whether one is somehow more real than the other. Metaphysicians have interpreted the natural world, the significance of time and space, and the existence and nature of God, all in an attempt to understand the relationship between forms and ideas.
Metaphysical argument is by and large an a priori process. A priori arguments start with basic, mutually consistent assumptions and develop them through to their logical conclusions. If absurdities arise during this deductive process, the original principles must be rejected or reevaluated. Since metaphysical conclusions are by nature extremely general, all encompassing assertions that are paradigms of thought rather than statements of empirical fact, refuting them with counterexamples is ineffective criticism. Moreover, unlike in the empirical sciences, where new knowledge supersedes old beliefs, numerous conflicting metaphysical theories have all stood the test of time, affirming the notion that there is no single metaphysical truth. The first metaphysicians, Parmenides and Plato, recognized a basic distinction between appearance and reality. Plato rejected the changeable, deceptive reality of the sensible world in favour of the unchanging and therefore truthful world of ideas. Aristotle began with Plato’s distinction between form and matter and then integrated the two using a biological model. Aristotle assumed that matter was always moving towards its potential ideal form. In this way the material world is seen as a continuum of orga-
nic change. With the development of Christianity, philosophers became concerned with finding an a priori proof of God’s existence. Thomism, based on the metaphysics of St. Thomas of Aquinas, combined Aristotelian and Christian thought. According to St. Thomas, the contemplation of the everyday (which was the basis of Aristotle’s examination of the relationship between form and matter) inevitably leads to the understanding that God exists and is the prime and sustaining cause of the material world. By examining the finite, ever changing material world, one is inevitably led to the source of change, i.e., God. Rene Descartes caused another major shift in metaphysical thought. His dualistic philosophy defined the material and mental spheres as separate, independent realms. Rejecting the notion of God proposed by the Christian philosophers, Descartes postulated that material world was set up by a prime agent, but thereafter, like a great mechanism, it ran free of divine interaction. Immanuel Kant accepted dualism but rejected Descarte’s explanation and revolutionized metaphysics by demonstrating the importance of per-
ception. According to Kant, objective reality must be perceived through the human constructs of time and space. Thus the human view of the material world would always be influenced by the perceiving mechanism. What earlier metaphysicians had considered objective reality, Kant rejected as such, subordinating all observation to the mechanism of observation. Materialism and Idealism tried to synthesize the concepts of mind and matter within a single theory. The Idealists merged the two spheres by subordinating matter to mind. Materialists assumed the antithetical position, subordinating mind to matter and asserting that all that existed was matter that the mind was dependent on objective circumstances. Several philosophers have questioned the validity of metaphysical methodology and conclusions. David Hume asserted that all knowledge comes through the senses. Since all basic concepts are derived from sense experience, Hume concluded that there is no pure thought. Logical Positivism, a 20 th century school of philosophy, asserted that any statement’s meaning depends it can be verified. Since metaphysical statements cannot be verified, Logical Positivists concluded that metaphysical assertions have no meaning.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s criticism viewed metaphysical experience as something beyond the realm of language. Wittgenstein argued that there were things that could be said and things that could only be shown. Metaphysical theorizing is unsuccessful because it tries to talk about a realm that exists outside of the realm that language can illuminate.
Metafisika Ontologi: Idealisme Hakikat Idealisme Ide, pikiran, kesadaran, dan spiritual memegang peranan sentral di dalam penginterpretasian pengalaman manusia. Pada pokoknya, dunia atau realitas ada di dalam atau berhubungan dengan spiritual, ide, atau kesadaran Jenis Ide Ada ide konkrit dan ide abstrak Ide konkrit: berkaitan dengan benda atau manusia Ide abstrak: berkaitan dengan atribut atau relasi
Metafisika Ontologi: Idealisme Cabang Idealisme Ada banyak cabang idealisme yang agak berbeda satu dan lainnya Beberapa di antaranya Idealisme subyektif Idealisme obyektif Idealisme metafisik Idealisme formalistik/transendental Idealisme kritik Idealisme estetik Idealisme moral Idealiseme dialektika (Hegel) Idealisme empirik Idealisme absolut Tidak dibahas
Metafisika Ontologi: Idealisme Ciri Umum Idealisme Universal dan individu kedua-duanya ada dan berpadu Ada yang lebih tinggi dari keberadaan kita di sini dan kini (transenden) Esensi sesuatu dapat terhubung dengan esensi sesuatu lainnya Melalui pendekatan, hal yang bertentangan dapat membentuk satu sistem (tesis, antitesis, sintesis) Ada yang rendah dan ada yang tinggi; yang rendah dapat dijelaskan oleh yang tinggi, tetapi tidak sebaliknya. Ide, pikiran, kesadaran adalah tinggi sedangkan materi adalah rendah Melalui pikiran dan kesadaran, yang tidak baik dapat dijadikan baik
Metafisika Ontologi: Materialisme Hakikat Materialisme Materi adalah merupakan satu-satunya penyebab dan sumber dari keberadaan dan perubahan Materi adalah utama sedangkan ide terhubung dengan materi Penganut atom Yunani Kuno (Leucippus dan Demokritus) dianggap sebagai penganut paham materialisme Materialisme mengenal pengujian melalui observasi umum dan menolak intuisi pribadi Cabang Materialisme Materialsime mekanistik Materialisme dialektik (Marx)
Metafisika Ontologi: Materialisme Ciri Umum Materialisme Peristiwa mental sebenarnya adalah peristiwa fisik yang rumit; semua proses mental ditentukan oleh proses fisik Semua fakta termasuk pikiran dan kemauan manusia dan jalannya sejarah bergantung secara kosal kepada proses fisik atau dapat direduksi ke proses fisik Proses mental dan proses fisik adalah dua aspek yang terjadi pada substansi Jalannya sejarah ditentukan oleh interaksi di antara orang dan benda, serta dapat diprediksi, tanpa mengacu kepada sesuatu yang lebih tinggi (transenden) Menunjukkan doktrin dalam bentuk hipotesis yang diuji secara umum
Metafisika Ontologi: Realisme Realisme Aliran realisme beranggapan bahwa universal adalah suatu realitas Mereka beranggapan bahwa secara obyektif, universal ada di dalam alam, di luar pikiran manusia Realitas universal adalah tetap sedangkan realitas partikular berubah-ubah Plato dan Realisme Plato menganut realisme Menurut Plato, pengetahuan bersifat tetap sehingga pengetahuan tidak diperoleh dari partikular (materi) yang berubah-ubah Pengetahuan diperoleh dari universal (ide) yang tetap
REALISM Realism, in philosophy, the conception that objects of sensory perception or of cognition in general are real in their own right and exist independently of their being known or related to mind. Though of modern origin, the term Realism is freely applied today to certain aspects of Greek and medieval philosophy, as well as to modern tenets. In the history of philosophy the most persistent and profound Realist concern is that of the reality of “universals,” or principles and rules governing the classification of things. It seems essential to believe that one is doing something rightly when, for instance, one classifies a new object as a chair (if that is what it is) rather than as an elephant. However, the nature of this rightness itself remains elusive. Realists assert that such classification reflects distinctions inherent in the world; conceptualists, by contrast, grant universals reality only a a categorical concepts within the mind; and Nominalists restrict the reality of the so-called natures of things even further, to mere names. The first of these views was embraced by Plato, who considered correct classification to involve apprehending a real common “form” which items classified together shared; the second is the view pro-
pounded in the Essay of John Locke ( ); and the last appears in writers ranging from William of Ockham ( ) to Ludwig Wittgenstein ( ). In light of the Nominalist assertion, it would seem that uttering words would not consist in making judgments at all, for nothing would count as correctness or incorrectness (Wittgenstein struggled hard to avoid this consequence). It is necessary, according to the Realists, to arrive at some conception of the further fact that makes talk of correctness appropriate. Realists believe that such a fact resists both reduction and the attribution of any Idealist, mind- dependent status, the two positions most favoured by opponents of Realism. This dispute underlies any analysis of the judgment of truth or falsehood and thus infuses virtually all philosophical issues. Another issue central to the Realist-anti- Realist debate is that of the status of immediate, individual objects of perception. Realist, as opposed primarily to the Idealists and Phenomenalists, hold that the senses afford knowledge of the distinct, real existence of independent object in space and time. The difficulty for the Realist is that the experiences on the basis of which one knows about such objects are themselves apparently private and dependent for their
existence and nature upon the mind. The Realist therefore seeks a link that permits knowledge of one kind of thing on the basis of another, and opponent charge that this leads inevitably to skepticism. This standard philosophical pattern is the usual source of reductionist and instrumentalist programs.
Metafisika Ontologi: Konseptualisme Konseptualisme Universal atau konsep umum tidak ada di dalam alam, melainkan hanya ada di dalam pikiran manusia Manusia memerlukan universal untuk dapat berpikir tentang partikular Penganut Konseptualisme Peter Abelard ( ) John Locke Sering tidak jelas apakah seseorang menganut konseptualisme atau nominalisme
CONCEPTUALISM Conceptualism, in philosophy, a term applied by modern writers to a scholastic theory of the nature of universals, to distinguish it from the two extremes of nominalism and realism. The scholastic philosophers took up the old Greek problem as to the nature of true reality, whether the general idea of the particular object is more truly real. Between realism which asserts that the genus is more real than the species, and that particulars have no reality, and nominalism according to which genus and species are merely names (nomina, fiatus vocis), conceptualism takes a mean position. The conceptualist holds that universals have a real existence, but only in the mind, as the concepts which unite the individual things; e.g., there is in the mind a general notion or idea of boats, by reference to which the mind can decide which a given subject is, or is not, a boat. On the other hand “boat” is something more than mere sound with a purely arbitrary conventional significance; on the other it has, apart from particular things to which it applies, no reality; its reality is purely abstract or conceptual. This was enunciated by Abelard in opposition to Roscelin (nominalist) and Guillaume de Champeaux (realist). Abelard held that it is only by becoming a predicate that the class-notion or
general term acquires reality. Thus similarity (conformitas) is observed to exist between a number of objects in respect of a particular quality of qualities. This quality becomes real as a mental concept when it is predicated of all the objects possessing it. Hence Abelard’s theory is alternatively known as sermonism (sermo “predicate”). His statement of this position oscillates markedly, inclining sometimes toward the nominalist, sometimes toward the realist statement, using the arguments of the one against the other. Hence he is described by some as a realist, by others as a nominalist. When he comes to explain that objective similarity in things which is represented by the class concept or general form, he adopts the theological Platonic view that the ideas which are the archetypes of the qualities exist in the mind of God. They are, therefore, ante rem, in re, and post rem, or as Avicenna stated it, universalia ante multipliciatem, in multiploicitate, post multiplicitatem (“universals exist before, in, and after multiplicity of their particulars”). The whole controversy suffers from a tendency to confuse “idea” in the sense of a concept or notion in the mind with “idea” in the Platonic sense of an ultimate archetype of phenomenal objects.
Metafisika Ontologi: Nominalisme Nominalisme Beranggapan bahwa universal tidak ada di dalam alam dan tidak juga ada di dalam pikiran manusia Universal hanyalah nama yang diberikan oleh manusia untuk menunjukkan kesamaan di dalam kelas atau kelompok partikular tertentu Penganut Nominalisme William dari Ockham (± ) Roscellinus
NOMINALSIM Nominalism, in philosophy, position taken in the dispute over universals—words that can be applied to individual things having something in common— that flourished especially in the late medieval times. Nominalism denied the real being of universals on the ground that the use of general word (e.g., “humanity”) does not imply the existence of a general thing named by it. The nominalist position did not necessarily deny, however, that there must be some similarity between the particular things to which the general word is applied. Thoroughgoing nominalists would withhold this concession, as Roscelin, a medieval nominalist is said to have done. But unless such similarity is granted, the application of general words to particulars is made to appear entirely arbitrary. Such stricter forms of nominalism as existed in the Middle Ages can perhaps be viewed as reactions against Platonic realism, on which some enthusiasts, such as Guillaume de Champeaux, based the opinion that universals had real being. The Realist position invited a defensive alliance between empiricism and nominalism; the most notable medieval example of such a synthesis was the work of
William of Ockham. In the Middle Ages, when Platonic and Aristotelian realisms were associated with orthodox religious belief, nominalism could be interpreted as heresy. But religious implications aside, nominalism does indeed reject Platonic realism as a requirement for thinking and speaking in general terms; and though it seems to deny also Aristotelian realism, such moderate nominalists as the 17 th -century philosopher Thomas Hobbes affirm that some similarity exists between particulars and the general word applied to them— otherwise thought and speech would be impossible. By explaining thought and speech through the use of symbols, such as mental images or linguistic terms, nominalism seems to imply some form of conceptualism that involves more than the mere correct use of symbols and thus is not clearly distinguishable from conceptualism. In modern logic a nominalistic concern is reflected in the form that is given to the universal quantifier. Instead of saying “man is mortal,” or even “all men are mortal,” the modern logician circumvents the universal by saying “for any x, if x is a man it is
mortal.” Neopositivism, in repudiating metaphysic, has often been explicitly nominalistic, insisting that there exist only “the facts” of observation and experiment. In the mei-20 th century, Nelson Goodman, a philosopher of science and of language, and Willard Van Orman Quine, a logician, have championed a modern nominalism that specifically rejects classes—Goodman for their being “nonindividuals” and Quine for their being “abstract entities.”
Metafisika Ontologi: Masalah Realisme Pada Zaman Pertengahan Selama beberapa abad (12-14), realisme dipertanyakan Terdapat sejumlah pertanyaan serta sejumlah anggapan Terjadi pergeseran anutan dari abad ke-12 ke abad ke-14 Beberapa Arti Universal Obyek dengan keberadaan sendiri (paling permanen) Konsep yang lahir di dalam pikiran dan subyektif Hanya kata atau urutan kata Kualitas atau kelompok kualitas pengenal atau kemiripan yang sering muncul Asas klasifikasi (taksonomi)
Metafisika Ontologi: Masalah Realisme Pertanyaan Anicius Boethius (±480-±524) Apakah universal ada secara realitas atau hanya ada di dalam pikiran Kalau betul ada, apakah universal berwujud fisik atau tidak Apakah universal terpisah dari benda fisik ataukah ada di dalam benda fisik Teori dari Albertus Magnus (1) universal sudah ada, sebelum adanya benda partikular, disebut ante rem (2) universal ada di dalam benda, disebut in materia atau in re (3) universal adalah abstraksi dari partikular yang sudah ada, disebut post rem
UNIVERSAL Universal, in epistemology and logic, a general term or common noun representing a recurrence or principle of grouping or classifying, which is considered as an entity and thus as posing the problem of what sort of being should be ascribed to the referents of general terms. It raises the question, for instance, of whether there is any redness apart from particular red things. The debate over the status of universals stems from the ancient Greek theory of Forms or Ideas, which Plato held to have a real existence distinct from their manifestations in individual objects; ideal beauty must exist, he thought, as a precondition of its manifesting itself, albeit imperfectly, in certain things recognized as beautiful. Aristotle was rather less positive, arguing that Forms or universals exist but only “in” the particulars in which they are discerned. Although both Plato and Aristotle were realists holding that universals are real, there was a difference between them, later summed up in the phrases universalia ante rem (Plato’s belief in “universals before the thing”) and universalia in re (Aristotle’s belief in “universals in the thing”).
Christian Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages were influenced on the one hand by Augustine’s identification of the Platonic Forms with archetypes in the mind of God and on the other by a passing reference by Boethius, a late Roman scholar, in his commentary on Prophyry’s Isagoge, to the questions “whether genera and species are substances or are set in the mind alone; whether they are corporeal or incorporeal substances; and whether they are separate from the things perceived by the senses or set in them.” The Platonic-Augustinian position, extreme realism, is reflected in the works of the Pseudo-Dyonesius the Areopagite, of John Scotus Erigena, of Anselm, of Guillame de Champeaux, and of Gilbert de La Porrée; the Aristotelian position, moderate Realism, in those of Albertus Magnus and of Thomas Aquinas. The medieval university’s opposition to Realism granted existence to universals only as mental concepts. Conceptualists arguments were first forward by Rocelin, by Abelard, and by William of Ockham; but Rocelin and Ockham were so uncompromising that their antagonists equated their conceptualism with Nominalism (i.e.,with the contention that universals are
Merely words or names arbitrarily applied to similar things for convenience). Modern scholars, however, doubt that there were any medieval Nominalists, for extreme Nominalism cannot explain man’s perception of similarities. In the 17th century, however, the Materialist philosopher Thomas Hobbes defended a moderate Nominalism based on the close connection between thought and speech. Later philosophers, divided between those who upheld the validity of ontology (the theory of Being) and those concerned only with logic and with linguistic analysis, shifted the perennial debate about universals into fields of epistemology barely explored by the Scholastics. Thus, modified forms of all four views--Platonic, Aristotelian, Conceptualist, and Nominalist--are still defended.
Metafisika Ontologi: Masalah Realisme Pada Zaman Pertengahan Universal sebagai ide berasal dari Plato, bersifat abadi dan tidak berubah; Plato: ante rem Menurut Plato, partikular atau individu adalah bayangan dari ide; Aristoteles tidak sependapat; Aristoteles: in re Pada abad ke-13, banyak ahli filsafat cenderung ke ante rem, realisme Pada abad ke-14, banyak ahli filsafat (termasuk William dari Ockham) cenderung ke post rem, nominalisme atau konseptualisme Tidak berkesudahan Perbedaan pendapat tentang realisme tidak berkesudahan, sehingga ditolak oleh positivisme
Metafisika Konsmologi Filsafat Kosmologi Filsafat Membahas proses realitas yakni bagaimana realitas itu terjadi Ada tiga aliran utama yakni deterministik, probabilistik, dan teleologis Deterministik Proses realitas itu terjadi secara pasti; banyak digunakan di dalam ilmu alam, misalnya hukum fisika dan kimia, melalui sufficient reason Sering dalam bentuk sebab (anteseden) dan akibat (konsekuen); sebab yang sama menghasilkan akibat yang sama Berlangsung secara mekanistik (seperti mesin), fatalistik (atas kehendak yang mahakuasa) Alam semesta adalah mesin raksasa, kalau semua hukum diketahui, maka masa depan dapat diketahui sejak sekarang
DETERMINISM Determinism, in philosophy, theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes that preclude free will and the possibility that man could have acted otherwise. The theory holds that the universe is utterly rational because complete knowledge of any given situation assures that unerring knowledge of its future is also possible. Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace, in the 18th century framed the classical formulation of this thesis. For him, the present state of the universe is the effect of its previous state and the cause of the state that follows it. If a mind, at any given moment, could know all the forces operating in nature and the respective positions of all its components, the world thereby know with certainty the future and the past of every entity, large or small. The Persian poet Omar Khayyam expressed a similar deterministic view of the world in the concluding half of one of his quotations: “And the first Morning of Creation wrote/What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.” Indeterminism, on the other hand, though not denying the influence of behavioral patterns and cer-
tain extrinsic forces on human actions, insists on the reality of free choice. Exponents of determinism strive to defend their theory as compatible with moral responsibility by saying, for example, that evil results of certain actions can be foreseen, and this in itself imposes moral responsibility and creates a deterrent external cause that can influence actions. KIND OF DETERMINISM Intrinsic determinism (related to God) Logical determinism Extrinsic determinism (related to cause) Causal determinism
Metafisika Kosmologi Filsafat Determinisme dan Indeterminisme Fisika klasik berpegang kepada determinisme Fisika modern (subatomik partikel) memunculkan indeterminisme (uncertainty principle dari Heisenberg, tahun 1928); ada ketidakpastian yang kecil sekali (orde konstanta Planck) di antara letak dan kecepatan partikel subatomik Probabilistik Proses realitas berlangsung secara probabilitas, seperti pada hasil lemparan dadu Di dalam deterministik yang makro, secara mikro terdapat probabilistik, misalnya, paruh umur pada keluruhan atom uranium adalah deterministik, tetapi pada suatu saat atom mana yang luruh adalah probabilistik
Metafisika Kosmologi Filsafat Teleologis Proses realitas berlangsung menurut kehendak (ada kebebasan untuk memilih) Finalistik Aristoteles (proses diatur oleh tujuan yang akan dicapai oleh proses itu) adalah suatu teleologis Vitalistik (prinsip kehidupan yang mengatur proses realitas) juga adalah teleologis Vitalistik muncul dalam bermacam-macam istilah: elan vital dari Bergson, psyche dari Aristoteles, pneuma, anima, entelechia, anima sensitiva, essentials, nisus formativus, creative activity dari Campbell Organistik beranggapan bahwa realitas berlangsung secara menyeluruh (organ) sehingga tidak dapat diprediksi melalui bagian- bagiannya
TELEOLOGY Teleology (from Greek telos, “end”; logos (“reason”), explanation by reference to some purpose or end; also described as final causality, in contrast with explanation by efficient cause only. Human conduct, insofar as it is rational, is generally explained with reference to ends pursued or alleged to be pursued; and human thought tends to explain the behavior or other things in nature on this analogy, either as of themselves pursuing ends, or as designed to fulfil a purpose devised by a mind transcending nature. The most celebrated account of teleology was that given by Aristotle when he declared that a full explanation of anything must consider not only the material, the formal, and the efficient causes, but also the final cause--the purpose for which the thing exists or was produced. With the rise of modern science in the 16th and 17th centuries, interest was directed to mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena, which appeal only to efficient causes; if teleological explanations were used, they took the form not of saying (as in Aristotelian teleology) that things develop toward the
Realization of ends internal to their own natures but of viewing even biological organisms as machines ingeniously devised by an intelligent being. In the 18th century, William Paley, a Protestant apologist, gave classic expression to this kind of teleology. Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der Untheilskraft (1790; Critique of Judgment, 1892 with revision 1915, reprinted 1951) dealt at length with teleology. While acknowledging--and indeed exulting in--the wondrous appointments of nature, Kant cautioned that teleology can be, for man’s knowledge, only a regulative and not a constitutive principle; I.e., a guide to the conduct of inquiring rather than to the nature of reality. In the 19th century, controversy centred on whether the phenomena of growth, regeneration, and reproduction characteristics of living organism could be explained in purely mechanistic terms. The vitalism of Hans Driesch, a German biologist and philosopher, according to which an Aristotelian entelechy, or immanent agency, must be postulated in every organism, found little support after his death. There remains, however, the question of whether biological processes can be explained in purely physiochemical
terms, or whether the problems of structure, function, and organization necessitate some kind of teleology. Organismic conceptions, such as those espoused in the mid-20th century by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an Austrian-Canadian theoretical biologist, have thrown these issues into a new perspective.